Abstract. The effects of the Chernobyl nuclear accident on the psychology of the affected population have been much discussed. The psychological dimension has been advanced as a factor explaining the emergence, from 1990 onwards, of a post-accident crisis in the main CIS countries affected. This article presents the conclusions of a series of European studies, which focused on the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. These studies show that the psychological and social effects associated with the post-accident situation arise from the interdependency of a number of complex factors exerting a deleterious effect on the population. We shall first attempt to characterise the stress phenomena observed among the population affected by the accident. Secondly, we will be presenting an analysis of the various factors that have contributed to the emerging psychological and social features of population reaction to the accident and in post-accident phases, while not neglecting the effects of the pre-accident situation on the target population. Thirdly, we shall devote some initial consideration to the conditions that might be conducive to better management of postaccident stress. In conclusion, we shall emphasise the need to restore confidence among the population generally.
Introduction
The effects of the Chernobyl nucler accident on the psychology of the affected population have been much discussed. The psychological dimension has been advanced as a factor explaining the emergence, from 1990 onwards, of a post-accident crisis [1] in the Ukraine. Belarus, and Russia, the main CIS countries affected.
In 1991, the concept of stress was introduced in an attempt to account for the psychological effects of the Chernobyl accident. Generally speaking, stress is conceived as the unavoidable result of a disaster situation. To understand the processes by which stress originates in the specific context of Chernobyl may well suggest appropriate means of dealing with the post-accident situation. It may also point up possible approaches to the management of hypothetical future disaster or accident situations. Our aim here is to identify ways to reduce stress factors, or if not, foster conditions in which solutions are more readily available. This in turn depends on improving our ability to take into account social factors prior to, during, and after the accident situation. Our approach is an enquiry into the general strategy to be adopted when handling accident situations. Our goal in so doing is to make a contribution to reducing the traumatic effects of such accidents on the population in the short, medium, and longer term.
While taking psychological and social factors into account in the management of nuclear accidents has positive results, 'over-psychologisation' can have serious and harmful effects. In the Chernobyl context, over-psychologisation has largely contributed to reinforcing the distress of the population, while also increasing its distrust of the medical authorities. This tendency came to the fore very soon after the accident, and was not unconnected to the introduction by the Soviet authorities of the confused notion of 'radiophobia', in 1987. The concept claimed to account for the reactions of the population in the post-accident situation. It was, however, gradually abandoned after 1991, and replaced by the more elaborate concept of 'stress', which gave a better account of the observable factors in the post-accident situation.
However, some interpretations have given credence to the idea that the psychological factors at play could be the main cause of the observable and general deterioration in the state of health of the population in the contaminated regions [2] . We cannot entirely agree with this view.
On the contrary, the somatic disorders reported by the population should be the subject of rigorous evaluation. It is particularly important to establish the degree to which they are linked to the accident. The real extent of the reported somatic disorders, and the actual degree to which they are directly or otherwise linked to the accident, will radically affect the psychological assessment of the situation. For our part, we believe that it is important to make a clear distinction between the direct somatic effects (both immediate and deferred) arising from exposure to radiation or contamination, and the possible indirect psychosomatic effects.
In the current situation, any assessment of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident on human health must be provisional.
The various international medical investigations [3] [4] [5] [6] to which we have access today lend weight to the hypothesis that some categories of the population exhibit real, emerging somatic side effects. It appears that these effects-or at least some of them, such as thyroid pathologiesare in fact the deferred effect of exposure to radiation and radioactive contamination occurring at the time of the accident. Further investigations may well lead to a clearer understanding of the origin of some of the clinical symptoms, both as reported by the population, by doctors in the contaminated regions, and by the national medical authorities in the Ukraine [7] . These symptoms include cardiovascular effects and immunodepressive syndrome. In the light of the evidence, there should be no question of assigning all of the somatic effects of the Chernobyl accident to a purely psychosomatic origin.
The situation needs to be understood in its full complexity. It would be wrong to deny the possibility of direct biological, somatic side effects of exposure to or contamination by radiation at the time of the accident. However, it would be equally wrong to deny the existence of stress and psychological disturbance suffered by the population, as a result of the accident.
Granted that there are direct (although as yet not fully understood) somatic effects of the disaster, full account should be taken of other factors which may aggravate morbidity.
One such potential factor is the psychological state of the population itself.
A complex psychosomatic [8] , or soma-psychological process, may be at work. Or again, the population's psychology may be affected by a deterioration in the economic climate in the relevant CIS republics, and be directly or indirectly associated with poor nutrition, or lack of medication. Interestingly, ongoing epidemiological studies among certain categories of the population subsequent to the accident have brought to light low levels of public health prior to the accident.
In this article, we shall be presenting the conclusions of a series of studies, carried out as part of the joint programme of the European Union and the CIS, which focused on the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. These studies show that the psychological and social effects associated with the post-accident situation arise from the interdependency of a number of complex factors exerting a deleterious effect on the population. Such factors either exert their influence at various stages in the accident management situation, or are characteristic of the context in general.
We shall first attempt to characterise the stress phenomena observed among the population affected by the accident. This will give us an opportunity to return to the notion of radiophobia, and demonstrate its inappropriateness. Secondly, we will be presenting an analysis of the various factors that have contributed to the emerging psychological and social features of population reaction to the accident and in the post-accident phases, while not neglecting the effects of the pre-accident situation on the target population. Thirdly, we shall devote some initial consideration to the conditions that might be conducive to better management of post-accident stress. In conclusion, we shall emphasise the need to restore confidence among the population generally. This is a key factor in resolving post-accident situations.
Nature of stress and stress-related phenomena

Stress observed in the post-accident situation
The concept of chronic and acute stress which is currently advanced as an explanation of some of the symptoms encountered among the population, both in the contaminated regions and where resettlement has occurred, should be distinguished from stress in the meaning of the media and of everyday language. Historically, stress as a concept is a derivative of trauma-induced neurosis, and many psychiatrists are still cautious about it [9] . The concept is basically employed in the description of reactions to disaster situations, the conventional term being 'post-traumatic stress disorder'. The term covers not only the purely psychological, but also biochemical and neurophysiological aspects.
Stress may also be considered as a response to physical or chemical aggression [10] , and should not necessarily be considered as purely psychological in origin. Stress can quite appropriately be considered to induce or aggravate somatic disorders, just as it can be considered as the result of the psychophysiological processes arising from exposure to radiation.
This latter, more elaborate concept of stress is applied descriptively to the continuing inability to adapt at the biological, psychological, and sociological levels. The body, the nervous system, and the psychology of those affected enter a state of alert or excitation, involving a permanent expenditure of energy. The result is bodily dysfunction and pathological effects manifesting themselves both organically and psychologically (extreme fatigue, insomnia and depression). The state of stress is characterised by the more or less momentary inability to employ symbolic means of expression. By this is meant the difficulty or even total inability of the subject to devise personal representations or to refer to collective representations, and so come to terms with and ascribe meaning to the aggressions and stimulation to which he or she is subject. The resulting loss of ability to react is associated with feelings of extreme anxiety and unease. A characteristic of the stress situation is that habitual, regular, and familiar responses are dislocated, and that the subject is unable to find satisfactory solutions to the problems with which he or she is confronted.
If so defined, stress is more than a characteristic of an accident or post-accident situation. Stress is an ontological characteristic of contemporary life, and more particularly of developed societies, in which greater demands are placed on individuals and society to adapt and become mobile. No sooner has an individual become accustomed to a new situation, than he or she, in a context where nothing is assured, is de-stabilised; certainty and stable landmarks are lacking.
In the accident and post-accident context of Chernobyl, stress is exacerbated and sustained, with no apparent possibility of satisfactory resolution. The investigations carried out in the field in the Ukraine (cf the studies referred to above) have shown that the psychological disturbance throughout the regions affected is at a level high enough to cause concern. This is clearly linked to the accident and its consequences. A climate of widespread anxiety is obsevable among various groups studied-those resettled, those staying on in the contaminated territories, and those directly involved in accident management. This anxiety focuses on the effects of the Chernobyl accident on the health of those surveyed, and their families. A particular focus is the health of children.
Anxiety is manifest in interviews, where multiple references are made to various somatic effects reported by the population. These are systematically attributed by those questioned to the Chernobyl disaster. Constant reference is made to thyroid disorders. There are frequent mentions of the sudden and apparently inexplicable deaths of the liquidators.
Various characteristic reactions along the above lines are very much in evidence among the relocated population, among whom it is rare to find psychological and social recovery from the consequences of the trauma of definitive resettlement. That it might be possible to put matters out of mind and return to a normal life appears to be a solution not available to those involved, consumed as they are by their feeling of irrevocable loss. In most cases, those questioned speak about their lives 'before and after' the Chernobyl accident. Life after the accident is seen as a form of survival. The experience seems to stand in the way of possible reconstruction or return to the status quo ante. Those interviewed expressed considerable disquiet and concern about the future. The as yet emerging effects of the accident, as perceived by the population, seem to be a cause of special concern, more so than the past effects. This fuels a pessimistic and fatalistic vision of the future, which is particularly striking among the children of the resettled population. The conviction that the situation can only get worse seems to reinforce the passive reactions of those surveyed.
Studies carried out as part of the European research effort [11] support these observations. They highlight, among the target population, an acute feeling of lack of control over individual living conditions. The feeling of being 'out of control' is clearly linked to a high level of psychological distress in the affected population.
Radiophobia, a clinically untenable notion
The notion of radiophobia was put forward by Soviet experts within a few months of the Chernobyl accident, in an attempt to account for population reactions. The notion was an initially convenient explanation for the fears of the population over radiation exposure-such fears being considered groundless by the experts themselves, at the time. In 1987, Professor V Knizhnikov of the Soviet Ministry of Health, described 'radiation phobia' as a fear arising from lack of objective information and from the low level of competence of the medical profession in the field of radiation medicine, the resulting situation potentially giving rise to behaviour leading to dangerous consequences. He declared: 'Parents were scared to give their children milk, believing that it was contaminated. The result was rickets' [12] . Similarly, in 1989, according to L A Iline [13] member of the Soviet Academy of Science, Director of the Institute of Biophysics, President of the National Commission for Protection Against Radiation: 'People are living with permanent expectations of potential radioactivity-induced damage to their health, not because of a particular dose received, but simply because of radioactivity in general. This is a state of mind that I have called "radiophobia". This designates a groundless fear of ionising radiation. ' The hypothesis of radiophobia, as first formulated by the Soviet authorities, and subsequently broadly accepted in a more international context, is a surprising one. It is difficult to conceive how the concept of phobia could apply to a situation where all the evidence showed that there were objective grounds for a degree of anxiety among the population. The known facts were legitimate cause for query, for controversy, and for expert discussion on the degree of radiation hazard.
In psychiatric terms, a phobia is a groundless and irrational fear concerning objects and situations that are not in themselves hazardous. A phobia is a symptom, or a neurotic organisation which typically refers anxiety to situations and objects that become associated with paralysing fear. The object is familiar to, but feared by the patient. Whenever not in the presence of the object of the phobia, the subject is unperturbed. The object is neither hazardous nor a direct threat and the subject is aware of this. However, in the presence of the object of phobia, the subject is gripped by a fierce anxiety characterised by somatic symptoms (dizziness, breathlessness, tachycardia, insomnia, etc).
Radioactivity is far from non-hazardous. For this reason alone, its fear is more correctly described as 'fear of radiation', and not 'radiophobia'. But if it were a groundless phobia, whence the need for the evacuations, countermeasures, restrictions on food, and the evacuation of children?
The observations carried out on the field in the Ukraine [14] demonstrate the untenability of the concept of radiophobia. Environmental contamination was a basic concern for most of the persons questioned, as inhabitants of the contaminated regions. They expressed anxiety regarding the effects of this contamination on their own health as well as on the health of their families. Analysis of the interviews showed that this fear was, in psychiatric or psychoanalytical terms, not akin to a phobic syndrome.
Those questioned expressed their fears and their anxiety, but never in the form of unreasonable fear, or uncontrollable anxiety. Their fear was always underpinned by a rational approach to the question, in which allusions were made to personal observations. Conversations with phobic children in the Ukrainian Centre Radiological Medicine showed that theirs were not phobias related to the accident itself. The observed syndrome was limited to classic infantile phobia.
In order to comprehend the developing postaccident situation, it is important to subject the concept of radiophobia to scrutiny.
The introduction of the concept of phobia by some experts and by the authorities was a form of denial of what the population was feeling. It was also a powerful contributory factor in increasing the population's own worry and mistrust; and this in itself aggravated the post-accident crisis. To confuse stress with phobia is not without consequence. To acknowledge the existence of stress in someone who is subject to fear is quite different from describing the fear itself as a phobia. To do the latter amounts to denying the existence of a real cause for the fear. This is quite inappropriate in the Chernobyl situation, where the cause for fear is real enough.
In the eyes of the population, contamination was a new, insidious, and extremely disquieting phenomenon.
In the face of such a threat, the assessment of hazard by the population can only take place when mediated by experts. But the credibility of the experts and their message depends on the degree of confidence that the population places in that message. If there is no trust, it is neither groundless nor unreasonable on their part not to believe the experts' message, and to feel fear when the experts state that there are no risks. The disappearance of a sense of social trust or confidence within the post-accident context of Chernobyl was a powerful contributory factor to population's psychological state of disquiet and anxiety.
The notion of radiophobia has today been abandoned by most experts. Yet it should not be forgotten that the appearance and demise of the theory itself were closely bound up with the economic and political context, and with changes that have occurred since the accident, in what was at the time the USSR. The 'psychiatrisation' of the consequences of the accident was a key factor in the political strategy of the Soviet experts and authorities in their management of the post-accident situation, and as such a contributor in its own right to stress among the population. Although radiophobia can, like torpid schizophrenia, be consigned to the showcase of scientifico-political teratology, the effects of the theory should not be neglected. Radiophobia, as a component of the strategy adopted by the Soviet authorities, is one among other stress factors affecting the population. And to these we now turn.
Stress factors
Identification of stress factors
Studies show that there are various stress factors linked with the management of the accident and of the post-accident situation in Chernobyl. Here, a distinction should be made between the acute stress observable in the accident phase, and the chronic stress which is characteristic of the postaccident situation, and which persists. Interviews have revealed how complex the situation is in the field. Many factors-ranging from the historical, physical, health and political, to the cultural, among others-underlie the post-accident situation. All need to be taken into account as explanatory and understood in their interaction. Each factor contributes in varying degree to an understanding of the situation, but none is in itself sufficient to explain it. The post-accident situation is also affected by inter-relationships between the present and the various prior situations, which continue to exert their effect.
A reconstitution of the various phases of management of the original accident and its subsequent phases, as well as an analysis of their charateristics and impact on the population is necessary for an understanding of the post-accident situation. From work along these lines a systemic model [15] has been developed which represents the various interactions which specifically contributed to an accentuated dimension of stress.
Without going into details of the model, the main factors which underlie the psychological and social effects of the accident are worth summarising. The studies carried out have shown the necessity of making a distinction between two stages in accident management. The first stage was the period of so-called 'Soviet-style' management, which we take to have run from 1986 to 1990. The second stage is one of national management, which coincides with the takeover of post-accident management by the political authorities of the newly independent states affected by the accident, namely the Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. By convention, the outset of the second phase coincides with the 1991 set-up in Ukraine and Belarus of national legal arrangements for post-accident management.
We also establish a distinction between the two physical phases of the accident. The physical effects (contamination, exposure) of the accident phase-by convention Phase A, beginning in April 1986 with the accident itself and ending with the construction of the sarcophagus in November 1986-are different from those of the postaccident Phase B, in which residual contamination persists. This is the current phase, characterised by the persistence of part of the radioactivity of Phase A.
The accident phase and the context prior to the accident
A characteristic of Soviet-style management was the authorities' recourse to censure and secrecy in Phase A, extending into Phase B until around 1990. Surveys have shown that information that might have revealed to the population the true extent of the accident and its consequences was systematically minimised or kept secret by the authorities. In spite of the reassuring attitude adopted by the authorities, part of the population in the vicinity of Chernobyl relatively quickly realised that the situation was serious. There were a number of unmistakable clues in the form of the noise and dust of the explosion, the immediately observable consequences, word of mouth alarm, the evacuation of hospitals to treat the victims, general disorganisation, and the hasty departure of the families of some senior managers.
Part of the population had ringside views. For this reason, the authorities very rapidly did their best to ensure secrecy by cutting telephone lines in certain villages as early as the second day, for example. There were many who had information from family members who had been working in the power station itself. Conversations in 1993 with accident evacuees indicate that those who had experienced the situation directly still had vivid memories of great fear. In conversation, a feeling of panic was apparent, and was still present seven years later. The sound of a doorbell ringing, or of a picture in the newspaper, for example, had the power to inspire considerable anxiety and fear. Memories were extremely vivid. The following quotations from the study carried out in the Ukraine (cf note 14) illustrate these feelings: 'We will never be able to forget, we didn't know how it would end, as far as we were concerned. I thought that there was no hope, that we wouldn't be able to set up anywhere else. We were so desperate that we could not imagine what would be left for us, how we would be able to live from day to day, nor even whether we would survive.' 'We didn't in any precise way think about the material difficulties, nor even about our health, but generally speaking we were frightened. We couldn't imagine what had happened, and how it would end.' 'People came in the night and told us 'Get ready, we're going to find you alternative accommodation for three days.' My husband said, 'Take more things with you,' and I was cross and said, 'What's the point of panicking? In three days we'll be back,' and then when I saw so many coaches, and long lines of cars and trucks, I was gripped by panic and fear.' 'The fear was generalised across the country, particularly so for those of us who had seen the accident. On reflection, things were simpler for us, because we had seen things. Those who lived further away must have been even more frightened, because they couldn't possibly imagine what had happened.' 'It was like an old film: old women carrying icons along the roadside, and younger ones with their suitcases running away.
Everybody was in a state of panic, and wanted to get away as quickly
Many conversations referred to a feeling of being in a war situation, in the first days after the accident. Some even thought that war had been declared. The way the accident was handled by the Soviet authorities was in many ways similar to a war situation, particularly through the mobilisation of the army, the call up of reserves, and the requisitioning of the population living close to the site of the accident. Semantically, in descriptions of the accident, reference was constantly made to historic war situations, to exodus (evakouatsiya), deportations and gulag (pereseleniyé), SS extermination units in the last war (likvidator), and to prisons or camps (zoha). A worker in the power station mentioned premonitory dreams of an American rocket falling on Pripyat in the months prior to the accident. Some experienced the accident as if it were an atomic war. A Pripyat doctor declared: 'All our lives we had been looking for enemies, enemies within, enemies without. In the final analysis, the enemy was our own system.'
The cultural and political context in which the accident occurred substantially aggravated stress. The way in which the disaster was perceived, and the pervasive climate of crisis were so many upheavals for the systems of representation which were the basis of Soviet society. The image of a world of certainty, in which everything was planned, forecast, and controlled by science and technology, as well as its claims to absolute consistency, were now invalidated. The accident introduced doubt as to the overall coherence of the system. A technician in the Chernobyl power station said in an interview: 'This situation was an impossibility, as no plans had been made for it. ' The accident opened up a new world of uncertainty, which was far from reassuring. With the introduction of a new mode of social organisation based on democracy-albeit one strongly characterised by an absence of landmarks and certainties-the momentum of political change increased, and with it feelings of insecurity that the accident did nothing to allay.
Generally speaking, the main feature of the accident situation was its deeply incomprehensible nature in the eyes of the population. People
The way the authorities spoke about the accident attempted to be reassuring. Their approach was meant to portray the appearance of control over the situation. But this stood in complete contradiction with some of the information that had been alredy been received by the population. When secrecy was imposed, the impression of inconsistency was increased.
Those who did have access to information started behaving in a manner quite incomprehensible to those who did not (precipitate evacuation of children by some figures of authority, for example). The situation heralded a persistent climate of doubt and distrust vis-à-vis the scientific, medical, and political authorities, and this had serious psychological and social consequences. The population's loss of confidence in the authorities was a major feature of the situation.
The post-accident phase
The eagerness of the authorities to tone down the accident situation had direct post-accident consequences. The population was deprived of a clear picture of the real cause of the delayed effects of Phase A, observable as they increasingly were in the field (thyroid pathologies). These effects of the accident phase were due to the authorities' failure to protect the civilian population in Phase A under Soviet-style management.
These after effects arose from failure-in virtually all casesto distribute stable iodine at the time of the accident. In many cases, evacuation was far too slow, particularly of the rural population in villages close to the accident site.
The appearance of the after effects of Phase A among the population coincided with emerging uncertainties as to the health prospects of the liquidators.
This, according to surveys, contributed to a climate of psychological morbidity in a number of regions. Under Soviet-style management, in Phase A, large numbers of liquidators were drafted in [16] . The liquidators themselves were subsequently allowed to disperse among the population without proper assessment of the state of their health and of the radiation risks they had been exposed to. Uncertainty over the risk to their own health remains a major stress factor for the liquidators themselves.
Furthermore, the toning down of the true accident risks by the Soviet authorities had ulterior consequences. From 1990, political debate on the accident itself focused on the potential after effects of Phase B. As the independent states came into being, and with them, the new political context, so post-accident management became the central focus of public and political debate. In this situation, the population's attention was first drawn to the effects of Phase B, at the expense of an overall assessment of the original accident. This further compounded the failure to come to grips with the real effects of Phase A.
In the current post-accident situation, the first stress factor-the after-effect, in the psychoanalytical sense-which we identify as being of importance, is the one relating to the way in which the initial accident phase was perceived. The accident (Phase A) is perceived more in terms of its after effects (thyroid pathologies), which broadly came to the notice of the population from 1990, that is, in Phase B. These were associated with that period although they were in reality caused by the earlier Phase A. From 1990 or thereabouts, the attention of the population focused on the recent disclosure of the Phase B effects of residual contamination, whose real origins in Phase A were thereby masked. In a confusion of cause and effect, the population attributed the Phase A after effects of the direct exposure to radiation, to Phase B exposure to residual contamination. In an apparently unavoidable misapprehension, the life-threatening pathological reactions due to Phase A were perceived as the effect of Phase B residual contamination and therefore extremely persistent. Past exposure was projected into a vision of boundless future contamination. The population, in effect, does not or cannot conceive of the gradual disappearance of the effects of radiation. On the contrary, radiation after effects will, in their view, exert an ever increasing and more harmful effect with time. Hence the general feeling summed up by an interviewee: 'The disaster is a growing tree. ' The second stress factor identified in the postaccident situation is the loss of trust, due to lack of confidence of the population in the scientific, medical, and political authorities. As the true scale of the accident and its consequences emerged, a situation of great complexity and extensive anxiety arose. As there was no climate of social confidence, individuals felt isolated. People generally felt-and continue to feelinsecure and deprived of the means to avoid hazards experienced as all-pervasive. Studies [11] highlight the sense of disarray experienced by the population, and its feelings of loss of control at being unable to resolve the situation. This loss of personal confidence appears to be related to the disappearance of a climate of social trust.
The introduction of the new post-accident management concepts-on which the laws of 1991 were based-is an identifiable third stress factor.
Surveys carried out in the Ukraine shows that the system of compensation introduced by the Ukrainian parliament-identical to the one introduced by Belarus-was of paramount importance to the daily lives of those questioned. The legislation does not differentiate between the past consequences of the accident (phase A) and the possible future consequences of the accident (phase B), for the population still resident in the contaminated regions. Generally speaking, the sole basis of the evaluation of exposure levels is the residual contamination levels of phase B. Exposures in phase A are taken into account indirectly, by extrapolation from the radiation exposure characteristics of phase B. Phase B effects therefore take priority.
Compensation is mainly channelled to the current inhabitants of the contaminated regions, to immediate evacuees, to those who subsequently found alternative accommodation, and to the liquidators. The study shows that the procedures for evaluating and compensating the medium and long term consequences have-for various reasons, and according to the category of population affected-contributed to slowing down the pace of return to a normal lifestyle. The principle itself of compensation is not at issue, however, and if properly applied could make a contribution to resolving the post-accident situation [17] .
The underlying reasons for the serious psychological distress felt by the population in the contaminated regions, according to surveys, are the management concepts applied to the contaminated regions (voluntary resettlement, stricter ecological monitoring of radiation and its environmental effects, and the compensation procedure commonly known as 'the coffin bonus'). A detailed study of compensation mechanisms, combined with interview analysis, shows that those who have benefited from the compensation system are in a paradoxical situation, a kind of 'double bind', as understood and developed by Gregory Bateson [18] . This situation generates further pain and internal stress among the recipients of compensation. Their situation may be described as follows. In the post-accident context, the population in the contaminated region is not only constantly exposed to radioactive contamination, but reminded of its objective presence through the continuing assessment campaigns carried out by the authorities. The population ask of the authorities, considered as experts, 'Could you tell us whether or not the contamnation is hazardous? Is there a risk?' This places any expert in a difficult situation, as no one can, in conscience, categorically state that there is no risk, even if the experts believe that the risk, given actual levels of contamination, is minimal.
Historical analysis [19] of changes in approaches to the protection of the population in the Chernobyl post-accident phases shows how every attempt at fixing a lower threshold for 'safe' exposure has had in turn to be abandoned. The 'acceptable' lifetime dose was initially fixed at 350 mSv. This has now been reduced to 70 mSv. However, in practice, the post-accident management procedures take into account the possibility of risk at dose levels far below this. Ongoing countermeasures are being taken at levels of continuing contamination in the 1-5 Ci km −2 range, that is, at an annual dose rate of below 1 mSv.
Zoning in the contaminated areas has set boundaries for permissible settlement. Three principal zones were defined, the first for compulsory relocation, the second for voluntary resettlement (of certain families with small children), and thirdly the monitoring-only zone. But even here, countermeasures were introduced. Bearing in mind the population's desire for an answer to their question-is there a risk?-such measures imply, but do not openly state, an answer in the affirmative. This also contributes to the situation of double bind. Confronted with the apparently conflicting affirmation and denial of risk, the population cannot react other than with distrust of the authorities, which is a further stress factor in its own right. Thus, the population confronting residual risk finds itself in a situation of incoherence, one which it is unable to adequately represent in symbolic form.
Finally, the surveys show that definitive resettlement induces chronic stress. This stress is not easy to resolve, particularly among the adult or older sections of the population. Resettlement is not like moving house. The Russian term for those who have been resettled (pereselenie) is pregnant with historical overtones of exile, deportation and the gulag. Those first compulsorily evacuated after the accident believed it was temporary-'for three days', according to the authorities. It was only later that they learned otherwise.
Surveys in the Ukraine show that resettlement was implemented by the authorities without much call on individual initiative. The areas of new accommodation were not a matter of choice, and were determined without taking into account geographical, cultural and social affinities. Those resettled were herded into blocks of flats or urban areas, which created a ghetto effect and hindered social acceptance. In some cases, whole villages were resettled, so that the social impact of resettlement was to an extent lessened. There was very little scope for individual initiative when it came to choices of new accommodation, which was imposed both in the accident and post-accident phases. This resulted in difficulties of social readaptation within a necessarily very different environment. The compensation system contributed to locking both the resettled population and the liquidators into their social status as 'Chernobylites', which so marks their personal and social lives. The accident continues to exert its psychological and other effects through the compensation system.
Compensation as practised contributes to inhibiting social adaptation. Evacuee status contributes to social segregation, being a cause of jealousy from the indigenous population, a hindrance to social adaptation, and thus socially segregating. The resulting jealousy from the indigenous population is a stumbling block to social integration.
Conditions for resolving stress
Behavioural and other factors contributing to the resolution of stress
Gregory Bateson [20] suggests that it may be possible to overcome stress-inducing double bind by means of the 'trans-contextual syndrome' which involves 'breaches in the weave of contextual structure'. This approach is based on his observations of a female dolphin (Steno bredanensis) in training. For a number of learning sessions, when the dolphin carried out a particular action in the demonstration tank (raising her head out of the water, for example), she heard a whistle (reinforcing signal), and was rewarded with food. Hence, she learned a number of simple rules involving the whistle, the pool, and her trainer, all of which formed part of a contextual structure or set of rules enabling her to coordinate the information received. After a whistle, the dolphin expects food. If she repeats what she did at the first blow of the whistle, she expects a further whistle and food.
In the following session, on return to the demonstration tank, the dolphin raised her head out of the water, but this time there was no whistle. The trainer waited for another clearly recognisable action (for example, a flap of the tail). When this occurred, the dolphin's action was reinforced. At the third demonstration, the flap of the tail was not rewarded. In the end, the dolphin learned to handle the general context as a series of contexts, and went through a sequence of different or new actions every time she came out into the demonstration tank.
During a similar experiment carried out with another dolphin, G Bateson noted that if the trainer felt it was necessary to break the training rules, the fact that the dolphin felt it had 'got it wrong' so disturbed the creature that the trainer, to preserve the relationship, had to carry out reinforcing actions which the trainee would not normally have been entitled to. The following fourteen training sessions produced no results. The dolphin repeated the behaviour that had been reinforced during the previous sessions. To all appearances, modifications in behaviour were only accidental. However, between the fourteenth and fifteenth sessions, the dolphin became apparently very excited. At the outset of the fifteenth session, it carried out a complicated series of eight separate actions, four of them totally new, none of which had ever been observed as naturally occurring in the species. This illustrates the genesis of a trans-contextual syndrome: 'Every time that a mammal is faced with confusion in the rules which give meaning to the important relationships it has with its own species, this is associated with pain and a sense of inadequacy which can have serious consequences. On the other hand, if the pathological aspects of the process can be avoided, there are chances that the experience may result in creative behaviour.' Thus when breaching in the contextual structure, the subject may be released from the sense of unease caused by a situation otherwise perceived as meaningless. The behaviour observed during the dolphin-training process throws a revealing light on possible reactions to high stress situations. The suddenly experienced sense of meaninglessness provokes unease and pain.
In humans, the resolution of the stress caused by such situations involves them reordering representations of the disconcerting or incoherent situation. The subject elaborates new representations, or brings into play collective representations enabling him or her to confer meaning onto the new situation. Hence direct or indirect action in a socially mediated manner becomes feasible, and the individual may be able in part to transform the stress-inducing situation into one consistent with his or her wishes.
This shows, when it comes to handling a disaster situation, how important the subject's prior representations are. Also to be noted, especially with regard to Chernobyl, is the potentially very considerable effect of the reluctance by the authorities to make information available. In so doing they contributed to preventing the symbolic reordering of the situation by the population. The recent references to Chernobyl in apocalyptic terms by those affected are in all likelihood part of a post-accident reordering or mental re-registering of the event into some form of meaningful construct.
The evolving situation in the Ukraine and Belarus
The representations elaborated by an individual in reaction to a discordant situation always involve his or her wishes regarding the context in question. Changing expectations in a given situation create possibilities for the profound remodelling of personal representations. Such change, however, is not the result of an act of individual will. It is the result of a process. The study of the post-accident situation in Belarus shows that certain conditions are liable to promote changing expectations, opening up the way to the stress resolution process.
The comparative analysis of the psychological and social situation in the contaminated areas of Ukraine and Belarus highlights very real differences in the way in which the inhabitants have lived through the post-accident situation. In some cases (Ukaine study cited above), the stress situation seems not to have reached a point where resolution is possible. Stress persists. Those involved feel unable to act independently, and this in conjunction with the continuing 'double bind' situation, has led to withdrawal, despair, and apathy. A climate of depression seems to have descended on the population.
In other cases, the stress situation seems to have gradually resolved itself, with stress being reduced or displaced as the result of both favourable conditions and resolution-positive behaviour adopted by the population. A study carried out in July 1994 of the contaminated parts of Belarus [21] , highlights the fact that a number of factors have contributed to the resolution of stress. The first of these is a characteristic attitude: denial of the risk associated with the contamination. Another is exercising freedom of choice: some have decided to continue living in the area which had originally been designated for total evacuation, although the decision was subsequently indefinitely postponed. In psychological and social terms, the general climate in the area under study in Belarus in 1994 differs markedly from the Ukraine situation as observed in 1993. There was not in Belarus the same depressed climate of opinion. This may be due to the lower intensity of the some of the stress factors, compared with the Ukraine (greater distance from the site of the accident, no liquidators among the population). The process observed in Belarus shows that it is possible, in some cases, to achieve a resolution of the postaccident stress situation. The situation is now a cause for a different concern, in that the population may be putting itself-wittingly or unwittinglyat risk by not taking the continuing presence of contamination into sufficient consideration.
The study in Belarus shows that an old wives' tale is rife among the population, some of whom attribute scientific certainty to the belief that immunisation against contamination is possible. The existence of contamination is not denied, but it is seen as inevitably part of daily life and the environment. Some of those questioned explicitly stated their conviction that they and their children were immune to the effects of radioactive contamination ('We're used ot it, we are immune'). A mother said of her child, 'These children were born in the contaminated environment. They have breathed in its air. It must be as normal to them as it was normal for us to have been born in a noncontaminated area. But perhaps one day the effects will be felt.' Note, even so, that the process of resolution does involve some anxiety, albeit more diffuse, regarding the possible long term effects of contamination on health. However, such concern does not appear to have a preponderant effect on the psychology of those concerned.
The study also showed that those who had opted to stay seem to have been personally committed in their decision. This was not the result of fatalism, for all that they had, since 1991, been subject to strong pressure-particularly economic-to stay, to come to, or to return to the area under study. Their decision to stay seems to have had the effect of contributing to the restructuring of their representations of contamination, of hazard, of health, and of daily life. A reorganisation of representation seems to have occurred among those who took the decision to stay on in the district, and appears to have been the point of departure for a change in their mentality. This, in contradiction to the reinforcement of feelings of misery and apprehension among those who stay unwillingly. The picture of the situation painted by those who have decided to stay and carry on with their lives is one in which they have seemingly opened up avenues to possible reconstruction, and to a life that is more than mere survival.
Conclusion: restoring confidence in the face of residual risk
In the post-accident situation, the breakdown of the bonds of trust is society is tied up with the lack of a collective, coherent representation of the situation by the population. This is symptomatic of the censorship and secrecy with which the accident and subsequent events were handled, and is part and parcel of a situation where no symbolic representations are available, one where no social-i.e. political, ideological, scientific, or religious-approaches have been developed as a means to cope with the situation. More or less historically accurate representations of events through myths or through symbolism, which can be effectively used to confer meaning, coherence, and consistency upon those events (cf the concept of narrative developed by Timothy Earle [22] ), are simply not available.
An accident such as Chernobyl, in terms of the scale of its consequences and the potential hazards of the technology involved, necessarily implies a centralised assumption of responsibility. Those personally exposed to hazard, delegated (at least in part) to the central authorities the responsibility of taking the required safety measures. The trust that is required for such a delegation of responsibility can be understood as part of a process, not so much of 'political economy', in the traditional meaning, as of a cognitive economy. The cognitive economy offers each individual release from the concern of inspecting and checking that the behaviour of others is consistent with his or her own interests. Hence a feeling of security and trust [23] . Social trust enables individuals to devote time to their personal activities, and to the responsibilities they deem to be their own, while delegating to others activities for which they cannot take full responsibility.
If trust disappears, the result, as far as the individual in society is concerned, is a feeling of solitude. Individuals are overwhelmed by the complexity of the accident, and post-accident situations. A feeling of lack of control, a sense that it is impossible to develop or to refer to individual or collective representations, leads to anxiety. The fact that there is no social trust means that no reliance can be placed on society, for social links are weakened or non-existent. Nor can collective actions be taken. The result is an unresolvable situation of stress.
In a major nuclear accident situation such as Chernobyl, the population is confronted with two types of risk. The first is associated with the accident itself, or Phase A. The second is the postaccident risk of Phase B. Accident risk is related to the accident itself, and when this phase is over, its effects continue to be felt in the perceived possibility of further, new accidents. Risk also persist through the possible after effects of the accident phase (thyroid pathology, for example). This is a classic industrial risk situation. Any return to confidence or trust after an accident or major incident requires corrective measures, and a redefinition of the procedures under which that risk will be socially regulated and controlled. It also requires that equitable measures be taken to evaluate and compensate for personal loss or bodily injury (even if deferred in time). It also may involve calling institutions and authorities into question, if they have lost their legitimacy and credibility. In the Chernobyl context, it was quite simply not envisaged, prior to the accident, that any such event could occur. The result, as we have seen, was a sense of acute stress, linked to the inconceivable having occurred.
Actual or potentially measurable risk in the aftermath of the accident comes from the contamination of inhabited or cultivated land. In Belarus, for example, two million people live on land which is legally recognised as contaminated.
The level of radioactivity is generally so low, that relocation is not considered necessary. However, the resulting low dose exposure cannot be considered insignificant. The scientific uncertainty surrounding the problem is such that the ALARA principle should apply, out of prudence.
However, in psychological terms, the problem is that persistent contamination, as perceived by the population, is not and cannot be interpreted in a manner consistent with their heritage culture.
This culture is essentially a world view shaped by 'scientific socialism', based in part on the abstraction and formalism-not to say symbolism-characteristic of positivism [24] . Unable, after the accident, to subscribe to such certainty of belief, the population reacted to residual contamination with sustained feelings of uncertainty, and experienced unalleviated stress. The anxiety and sense of vulnerability which arise when individuals confront contamination have been reinforced by strong if diffuse feelings of impotence. The population feels unable, either individually or through local action, to control a situation which is perceived as hazardous.
In a situation unavoidably bound up with feelings of powerlessness in the face of the problems, emerging perceptions of residual risk form the basis of the new social situation. The result is that the population calls into question the legitimacy of the social process whereby risk is identified and socially accepted. In the postChernobyl situation, it is no longer possible to 'have every confidence' in the assumed existence of an objective general interest, typically one determined by the experts. If confidence or trust are to return, it can only be through the sociallyand indeed, so far as possible, personallymediated acceptance of the concept of risk. This acceptance must permeate all levels of social transaction, in particular those seen as governing the underlying factors of risk. The risk assessment process must be perceived to be a reality in all situations, both prior to, during and after any accident, whether actual or potential. In other words, the acceptable level of risk is, quite simply, the one defined as acceptable by the very people who are exposed to it.
The problem is more than purely technical or scientific. It is how to discover and implement new ethical and democratic procedures. For these are the only ones under which decisions can be collectively taken, by those directly affected, regarding the level of risk they are prepared to accept.
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Résumé
La dimension psychologique est fréquemment invoquée pour rendre compte de certaines conséquences de l'accident nucléaire de Tchernobyl sur la population, en particulier pour expliquer l'émergence,à partir de 1990, d'une forte crise postaccidentelle dans les principaux pays concernés de l'ex-URSS. Cet article présente les conclusions d'une série de travaux européens sur les conséquences de cet accident. Cesétudes montrent que les effets psychiques et sociaux de cet accident résultent de l'enchainement pervers de plusieurs facteurs intervenusà différentesétapes de la gestion accidentelle et postaccidentelle. La première partie propose une description des phénomènes de stress observés dans les populations affectées par l'accident. La seconde partie présente une analyse des différents facteurs qui ont contribuéà l'émergence des effets psychiques et sociaux lors des phases accidentelle et postaccidentelle, comme dans le contexte ante-accidentel. La troisième partie concerne les conditions qui pourraient conduirè a une résolution du stress post-accidentel. La compréhension des processus qui sontà l'origine du stress dans le contexte spécifique de Tchernobyl permet de dégager des enseignements concernant la gestion d'éventnelles situations accidentelles futuresà travers une meilleure prise en compte des facteurs psychiques et sociaux.
Zusammenfassung
Die Auswirkungen des nuklearen Unfalls von Tschernobyl auf die Psyche der betroffenen Bevölkerung wurden oft diskutiert.
Die psychologische Dimension wurde als Faktor angeführt, um das Auftauchen einer post-UnfallKrise in den wichtigsten CIS-Ländern seit 1990 zu erklären. Diese Studie stellt die Schlußfolgerungen einer Reihe europäischer Studien vor, die sich auf die Konsequenzen des Tschernobyl-Unfalls konzentriert haben. Diese Studien zeigen, daß die psychologischen und sozialen Auswirkungen, die mit der post-Unfall-Situation zusammenhängen, auf die gegenseitige Abhängigkeit einer Anzahl komplexer Faktoren zurückzuführen ist, die eine gesundheitsschädliche Auswirkung auf die Bevölkerung haben.
Wir werden zuerst die Streß-Phänomene beschreiben, die in der durch den Unfall betroffenen Bevölkerung beobachtet wurden. Zweitens präsentieren wir eine Analyse der verschiedenen Faktoren, die zum Auftauchen der psychologischen und sozialen Aspekte der Reaktion der Bevölkerung auf diesen Unfall und in Phasen nach dem Unfall beigetragen haben, ohne die Auswirkungen auf die Zielbevölkerung vor dem Unfall zu vernachlässigen. Drittens werden wir einige vorläufigeÜberlegungen anstellenüber die Voraussetzungen für einen besseren Umgang mit post-UnfallStreß. Abschließend unterstreichen wir die Notwendigkeit, Vertrauen in der Bevölkerung generell wieder herzustellen.
